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In a recent interview with Verfassungsblog, Wojciech Sadurski lists his fears
accompanying the high probability of the Law and Justice forthcoming electoral
victory. He mentions fundamental rules and values, such as the constitutional order,
an independent judiciary, fair elections and free press. However, what can also
be at stake and what just seemingly may be considered of lesser importance, is
the possible conclusion of the process of reshaping the historical narratives and
introduction of a state-imposed vision of historical truth.
This vision does not accept the painful way of coming to terms with one’s nation’s
past, like it happened when in 2015, Olga Tokarczuk, the just announced winner of
the Nobel Prize in Literature, spoke about the Poles’ shared responsibility for the fate
of Jews and crimes committed against Ukrainians:
“We contrived a narrative of Polish history depicting Poland as a tolerant,
open country, one which has never disgraced itself with any wrongdoing
towards its minority groups (…). Meanwhile, as colonizers and an ethnic
majority, we did appalling things, suppressing minorities; we were
slaveholders and murderers of Jews.”
As a consequence, Tokarczuk received death threats, she was accused of being an
“enemy of the Nation”. But the fact is also that under present legal provisions and
their interpretation by the courts, the words she uttered could still be found damaging
the good name of the Polish Nation.
Last year, also on Verfassungsblog, those exploring the impact of law on memory
were wondering what effects the amendments to the Polish Act on the Institute of
National Remembrance are likely to have on the practical use of what are known as
memory laws. Even though the most controversial provisions introduced in the first
amendment of January 2018, which sparked an international diplomatic scandal,
have been erased, the laws in force left the door open to bids to stifle debates on
troubling historical issues using the tools of law.
Interestingly, it seems that no lawsuits have as yet been brought before the Polish
courts in reliance on the controversial amended regulations. So perhaps those
arguing that it is practically impossible for lawsuits of this kind to be allowed in Polish
courts were right after all. Then again, it may in fact be the case that the NGOs
entitled to sue under the amended regulations have chosen to lay low for now and
not exercise these rights for political reasons. In a parallel development, however,
Polish courts are increasingly becoming venues for settling disputes about the past,
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and the most recent court judgments prove just how far-reaching the effects of legal
incursions into the sphere of historical memory can be.
A highly problematic trend has emerged just recently, creating a precedent in the
Polish legal doctrine. In January 2017, the Polish edition of Newsweek magazine
published an article by Paulina Szewczyk entitled “After the Liberation of Nazi
Camps, Did the Poles Open Them Again? ‘The Little Crime’ by Marek #uszczyna”.
The author of this article stated that after 1945 Poles re-opened the #wi#toch#owice-
Zgoda camp, a branch of the former Auschwitz-Birkenau camp. A lawsuit against
Newsweek’s editor-in-chief was brought by Maciej #wirski, the president of the
Polish League Against Defamation (RDI), based on the press law provisions. In
January 2018, the court decided in his favour, ordering the editor-in-chief to publish
a corrigendum admitting that the assertion of the existence of “Polish concentration
camps” created by Poles is false. This initial ruling was subsequently upheld by the
Court of Appeal and eventually the Supreme Court, the latter finding Newsweek’s
last resort appeal (cassation) to be unfounded. 
The revolutionary reasoning of the Polish courts in this case was well summarized
by Monika Brzozowska-Pasieka, Mr. #wirski’s attorney, who described it as an
„absolute novelty and certainly a precedent”. As she explained, „the courts of all
instances, including the Supreme Court, stated that there was no need for the name
of Maciej #wirski to appear in the contested press material. It is sufficient that the
text concerns Poles, and then Maciej #wirski — as a Pole and also due to his social
involvement — may demand the material to be corrected. The trial court also argued
that national identity and national dignity are in fact personal rights and untrue
references to ‘Polish concentration camps’ infringe those rights”.
This viewpoint, novel in Polish case law, is also apparent in a more recent judgment
in which the Regional Court in Warsaw ordered the German newspaper Frankfurter
Rundschau to apologize to Mr. #wirski for its publication criticizing the Polish
government for its historical policy portraying the Holocaust as a “purely German”
atrocity. The Warsaw court found that to deny the sole responsibility of the German
nation for the Holocaust is to attack the Polish nation — and thus every Pole. The
central concern — without going into the legitimacy or otherwise of the statements
made by Frankfurter Rundschau or the efforts of some groups in Germany to
transfer the responsibility for the Holocaust to other nations under German
occupation during World War II (or rather to “share” this responsibility with those
nations) — is that in this case Mr. #wirski was deemed a person authorized to take
legal action on behalf of the nation so insulted.
However, not only the scope of legal standing remains a problematic issue here.
The right to one’s national identity is not explicitly mentioned in Article 23 of the
Polish Civil Code that protects personal rights. The existence of this right is a point
of contention among both legal scholars and courts and, even if some judicial
decisions may be seen as suggesting that it may in fact exist, there is no established
consensus in this respect. There are doubts as to whether a characteristic of
an entire ethnic or national community can be considered a legitimate individual
right, given that it is the community rather than any one of its members that has a
legitimate interest in such a characteristic. Moreover, a critique of some events in the
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history of Poland and the Polish Nation cannot be considered to be violating national
self-respect and identity because a lot of Poles may agree with such critical remarks,
and especially because debate and criticism may address conduct the victims of
which also included Polish citizens and which therefore was equally part of what
formed the identity and history of the Polish Nation. Therefore, what is protected in
the personal right involving self-respect and national identity is not one’s subjective
idea of a flawless heroic nation, but one’s freedom from humiliating statements
concerning nationality, from offensive remarks being made against members of
some ethnic group because of their ethnicity, or from insults made against the
community generally.
From the reasoning presented by Mr. #wirski in both of the cases mentioned, it
seems that the claims include also a rather contrived right to have a history of
World War II presented truthfully – however, it is not understood as a right to protect
personal history of a plaintiff or plaintiff’s relatives but rather as a demand to have
history presented and related in a certain way, being considered as true by a plaintiff.
Obviously, there is no such right (as long as we accept the individualised notion
of personal rights). While there is no doubt that history should not be falsified, it
is unclear how this relates to the legal construction of individual rights. Basically,
accepting that one has a claim to have history presented truthfully would do away
with the notion of individual rights in the context of statements about historical facts,
giving everyone the related right. Needless to say, there is nothing in the Polish civil
law that would support such a doctrine.
This new trend emerging in court rulings marks a radical departure from the
requirement prevailing thus far for there to be a direct relationship between a person
harmed and the action detrimental to this person’s good name, honor or the memory
of this person’s deceased loved ones. The described approach turns each personal
rights’ claim in memory and history cases into actio popularis, i.e. generally everyone
(or at least everyone who is legitimated by one core feature – affiliation to the Polish
Nation) is entitled to sue an alleged perpetrator of defamation of a good name of
the Polish Nation, even despite the fact that linkage between the personal situation
of such party and alleged defamation act remains rather weak. If this trend would
continue, it could open Pandora’s box by granting the right to sue those infringing
the good name of a certain group (transsexuals, vegans, fans of certain football club,
etc.) to each member of such group. This would of course result in a loop of claims
between antagonized groups in the society.
As previously stated, the new approach in the jurisprudence of the Polish courts
facilitates the process of reshaping the views regarding Polish history (as some
claim – in defence of historical truth against its distortion). But what really is at
stake here is the risk of whitewashing the uncomfortable truths. Even greater
risk, however, arises from the temptation of the governments to leave the legal
battles over history to individuals or organisations close to the ruling circles. This
way the governments may avoid entering into diplomatic disputes that can turn
into open international conflicts. This in turn can even open space for potential
politically inspired actions restricting free speech (or at least causing “chilling effect”),
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supported and, sometimes, informally directed by the government, while formally
being still just individually pursued claims.
The controversial nature of these recent verdicts of Polish courts stands out in
even sharper relief when viewed in the light of constitutional and international
standards of protection of freedom of speech. These standards call for the widest
possible freedom of speech in historical debates and emphasize — excepting the
case of Holocaust denial — the primacy of freedom in discussions of even the
most controversial statements about the past. Polish courts meanwhile have now
apparently taken the opposite course and want to restrict this freedom, such as
by granting the kind of far-ranging right to sue as was granted to Mr. #wirski. Let
us just briefly signal the prevailing standards that Polish courts may be breaching.
The general position in this regard of the ECHR was best summarized by Judge
Nussberger in the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in Perinçek v.
Switzerland:
There is not one historical truth that could remain permanently immutable.
On the contrary, new research and new discoveries of documents
and evidence may shed new light on what has been deemed to be an
uncontested view. Therefore, debate and discussion about history is an
essential part of freedom of expression and should in principle never be
curtailed in a democratic society, especially not by defining taboos on what
events have to be excluded from free assessment in public debate or by
establishing certain “official views” that must not be contested.
The most important aspect of the dictum of the Polish courts presented above is the
fact that for the purposes of trials regarding the Polish past and Poland’s good name,
Mr. #wirski, as a Pole engaged in historical disputes, seems to have become an
“emanation” of Polishness and of the Polish nation. Such understanding of the legal
concept of personal rights stands in stark contrast with the previous Polish case law
where an immediate and direct link between the harm done and the person harmed
was generally considered to be mandatory. Further developments in this regard,
highly relevant for the shaping of history with legal means, must be monitored
closely.
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